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Abstract 
The literature, starting with Chiswick (1977, 1978) to Gang and Zimmermann 
(2000), more recently, focuses on the economic achievements and performance of 
first- and second-generation migrants. This paper presents a three-generation migrant 
analysis, comparing relative economic performance of various migrant generations to 
one another and to the native population. We developed a theoretical model, which 
was then explored empirically using data from the 1995 Israeli Census. In both the 
theoretical and empirical analyses, the curve describing intergenerational immigrant 
earnings mobility is inversely U-shaped. The second generation earns relatively more 
than the first and third generations, while the third generation earns less than the 
second, but more than the first. Thus, assimilation of the third generation into the 
local population is far from clear.  
Keywords: Intergenerational earnings mobility, migration, labor market performance. 
JEL Classification: F22   2
1. Introduction 
Most studies to date comparing the economic performance of immigrants, 
among other aspects, with that of the native-born population mainly focused on the 
first rather than the second generation of immigrants. This motivated researchers to 
carry out more extensive research on the diverse aspects of absorption in various host 
countries among the second generation of immigrants, as compared to their parents 
and the native population.  
Several studies on changes in the relative earnings and employment patterns of 
the second generation have been carried out in various countries. Chiswick (1977, 
1978), for example, in his early work, examined the effect of foreign parentage in the 
United States in 1969 on earnings of native-born white male workers in the 25-to-64 
age range. He showed that earnings among second-generation immigrants were 
similar or slightly higher than among native white-born male Americans. Earnings 
were higher among immigrants with foreign- rather than native-born parents. Thus, 
according to Chiswick, any discrimination against second-generation Americans is 
apparently overcome by other factors.  
More recently, Gang and Zimmermann (2000) and Gang (1999) showed that 
ethnicity did not affect the educational achievements of second-generation 
immigrants, compared to those of natives in the same age cohort, in a large German 
data set. While parental schooling did not play a role in the educational choices of 
children of foreign-born parents, contrary to the general findings in the literature, 
there is a statistically significant difference in favor of the father's over the mother's 
education in children of native-born German parents. Similar studies among Jewish 
immigrants of various ethnic origins in Israel have been carried out by Amir (1988), 
Benski,  et al (1990), Lecker (1993) and Mark (1994), among others. The 
intergenerational mobility in earnings and immigrant workers assimilation in the labor 
market was studied by Kossoudji (1989), Berman et al (1990), Borjas (1992) and 
Solon (1992), among others, in the United States; by Lillard (2000) in Germany and 
the United States; and by Corak et al (1997) in Canada. Schultz (1984) in the United 
States and Binder (1998) in Mexico, among others, conducted research on schooling 
and educational achievements of such populations.   3
However, since relations between immigrants and native populations in the 
host countries are extremely complex, it is difficult to project the well-characterized 
economic behavior of the first generation of immigrants and the relatively less well-
deciphered behavior of the second generation into the third generation. Therefore, a 
multi-generation model comparing performance of immigrants and the native 
population in the host countries, particularly with respect to the labor market, is 
highly pertinent. 
In this paper, we develop a multi-generation model comparing labor market 
performance of immigrants and the native population, assuming that the latter is the 
appropriate reference group and not the home-country population. The model is based 
on the concept of bilateral altruism among immigrant generations, i.e., positive 
linkage of the father’s and son’s utilities via their earnings. Thus, if the father earns 
less than the native population, the son, would maximize his own utility by investing 
time and effort in increasing his earnings to compensate also for his father’s relatively 
low income. Thus, the second generation of immigrants would be expected to be in an 
advantaged position (at least with respect to the first generation). However, the third 
generation would revert to a disadvantaged status relative to the second generation, 
and possibly also to the native population.  
  We examined intergenerational mobility of relative earnings among 
immigrants to Israel, based on the 1995 Israeli Census of Population data. A two-fold 
comparative analysis over three generations was carried out on two levels: (1) among 
three generations of immigrants from Asian-African source countries; and (2) 
between immigrant and native Israeli populations.  
In the 1995 Israeli Census of Population data, first-generation immigrants 
showed relatively lower earnings than the second generation, but this fell again in the 
third generation. This supports the hypothesis behind our multi-generation immigrant 
performance model. In addition, separating the wage differential into human capital 
and market evaluation components throws new light on the effects of the relative 
investment in education in these three generations.  
By following immigrant economic behavior over three generations, both in 
theoretical and empirical terms, our model enhances understanding of economic 
behavior among immigrants in Israel, and may be projected to other countries.   4
Assimilation does not necessarily occur in the third generation, indicating that the two 
migrant-generation case cannot be generalized to all further generations.  
A bilateral-altruistic two-generation model of immigrant earnings is presented, 
which is then explored on 1995 Israeli Census data, and followed by a short summary 
and conclusions section. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider a bilateral-altruistic two-generation, model of immigrant earnings, in 
which the father’s and son’s utilities are positively linked through their earnings. 
Since they have no intention of returning “home,” the immigrants’ incomes are not 
given in absolute terms, but relative to those among the corresponding local native 
population.  
Under a time constraint, an individual’s earnings are determined by two 
consecutive decisions concerning: (1) the amount of time invested in education; and 
(2) the amount of time devoted to work. Note that the quality of education is 
positively related to time invested. To simplify, without loss of generality, we focus 
on the first decision: how to allocate time between education, e, and leisure, L under 
the time constraint, T . 
  Simplifying further, the effect of the father’s earnings on the son’s level and 
type of education is ignored, focusing on the time invested by the son in education, 
which may also be considered as invested effort (measurable in time units).  
  Under our assumptions, the father’s utility is defined as follows: 
(1)        () ( ) e I I U U s R f R f f , =   
where, I R f  and IR s(e) are the father’s and son’s incomes, relative to those of the 
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  The son’s utility, which is a function of his father’s, may be expressed as 
follows: 
(2)        () ( ) f s R s s U e I L U U , , =  










































































.  In addition, we assume a direct 
relationship between the time invested in education and the son’s relative (expected) 











I Rs  .  
 The son aims to maximize his utility by optimizing his level of investment in 
education, e, such that: 
(3)     () ( ) f s R s
e U e I L U , , max  
   s . t .       L + e= T  
The first-order condition is given by:    
(4)  













































s s f s R s  
or, alternatively: 












































The son’s utility function is assumed to satisfy the second-order condition: 
(6) 
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  We now examine how changes in the father’s relative earnings,  Rf I , affect his 
son’s optimal effort, 





























U d s , it follows that:  

















































































































































. Therefore, we conclude: 








  Note that the time invested, and not the type of education, were considered 
(clearly, the more the father earns, the higher the son’s level of education). Given the 
direct relationship between the son’s relative earnings,  Rs I
*
, and the optimal time 
devoted to education, 








e I Rs , we obtain:      











This result is summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition: The less the father earns, the more time and effort the son invests in 
increasing his earnings. 
   7
Recall that we do not consider the type of education but the time the son 
invests in education and at the work place with the aim of increasing his income 
(which is equivalent to an investment in effort, which is also measured in time units). 
Similar analysis would also apply to the son’s investment in promotion and raising his 
income at work. 
To gain better understanding of this proposition, let us consider the following: 
as a first generation migrant, the father is disadvantaged in labor market relative to the 
native population, due to discrimination, asymmetric information, linguistic problems, 
etc. The son, affected by his father’s low income, invests time and effort in increasing 
his own earnings, and, thereby, in turn, his father’s utility, to compensate for his 
relatively low income. Thus, the immigrant second generation would be expected to 
be in an advantaged position. In this case, the father’s lower earnings motivate his son 
to invest more time and effort in education and the work place. Thus, the father’s and 
son’s earnings are inversely related, as described by the downward sloping curve AB 
in Fig. 1-a, in which relative incomes, re, are measured on both axis. The father’s 
(first generation’s) relatively low earnings, re1
st, (on the horizontal axis), and the 
son’s (second generation) relative earnings are given by point A, re2
nd (on the vertical 
axis). Since the re2
nd-values are above the 45
0-line, they are higher than the first 
generation’s relative earnings, and the second generation is in an advantaged position. 
However, since the second-generation migrant is relatively advantaged, the third-
generation migrant, who no longer needs to compensate for his father’s low utility by 
investing more effort in education and the work place, reverts to a disadvantaged 
status relative to the native population. 
The 45
0-line, the son’s (second generation’s) earnings are projected onto the 
horizontal axis and thus, the grandson’s earnings, at point B, re3
rd, are less than re2
nd. 
Of course, his income would remain higher than his grandfather’s (the first- 
generation migrant), but lower than his father’s (second-generation migrant). These 
results are summarized in Fig. 1-b, where relative earnings are on the vertical axis and 
migrant generations on the horizontal axis. Thus, the intergenerational mobility in 
earnings follows an inverse U-shaped curve: the first generation has the lowest 
relative earnings, the second generation has the highest, and the third generation’s are 
higher than the first but lower than the second. 
   8
3. The Statistical Analysis 
3.1. Data 
The model is applied to the mass immigration to Israel after establishment of 
the state in 1948. Mass political immigration more than doubled the population of 
Israel between 1948 and 1952 - from 650,000 to 1.5 million. About 50% of these 
immigrants were from Islamic countries and the other 50% from Europe. However, 
since most of the absorbing (native) population in Israel at that time was from Europe, 
we focused on immigrants from the Islamic countries in Asia and Africa to avoid the 
effects of migration externalities.  
The data for the empirical analysis were derived from the 1995 Israeli Census 
of Population (20% questionnaire), focusing on the male population. Three 
generations were defined according to their ages on immigration and their ages in the 
1995 Census.  Thus, the first generation are Jews who were older than 10 when they 
immigrated to Israel between 1948 and 1952 from Asian-African countries. The 
second generation were immigrants aged 10 or younger who came during the same 
period, and Israelis aged between 33 and 53 in 1995, with immigrant fathers. The 
third generation are Israelis younger than 33 in 1995 with immigrant fathers whose 
age on immigration was 10 or younger. The native Israeli population is defined as 
those born in Israel to Israeli-born fathers. The age ranges for the first, second and 
third generations are: 53 or older, between 33 and 53, and 33 or younger. 
This model is explored by examining the wage differentials between the 
Jewish immigrants to Israel from Asian-African countries (A) and the Israeli native 
population (N) in the three generations defined above.  
  Table 1 presents the characteristics of groups N and A in the three generations 
in terms of education, years of schooling and six categories of the highest certificate, 
age and wages. Note that there may well be self-selection in both groups at this stage. 
The average ages of both groups are very similar in all the generations (see Table 1). 
The data are expressed as relative levels or percentages of the native (N) and 
immigrant (A) groups. However, to keep the interpretation consistent, education at the 
lower levels (without elementary or high school certificates) is calculated as the ratio 
between A and N, and at higher levels, as ratio between N and A. Thus, ratios greater 
than 1 favor group N and less than 1 favor A. Moreover, in first- and the third-  9
generation migrants, the average wage and years of schooling are higher among the 
Israeli native (N) group than among the immigrants (A) whereas, in the second 
generation, the opposite was found. In Fig. 2, the education ratio is greater than 1 for 
the first generation at all the levels of education, i.e., immigrants are less well 
educated than natives. The education ratios for the second generation is less than 1 
(except for B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in which the difference between N and A 
was greatly reduced relative to the first generation) i.e., in the immigrant second 
generation, the gap between their own and the native education levels closed. As in 
the first generation, the education levels were lower in the immigrant third generation 
than among the natives (except at the Ph.D. level). 
  These descriptive data coincide with the theoretical findings. On average, the 
second generation invests more time and effort in education than the first and third 
migrant generations. This trend is broken in immigrant third generation relative to the 
first. These findings indicate an increased investment in education by the migrant 
second generation, relative to the first, with a decrease in the third generation (note 
that the third generation’s performance is inferior to the second’s, but superior to that 
of the first).   
 
3.2. The Empirical Analysis  
The empirical analysis explores the hypothesis behind the model: that the 
immigrant second generation’s labor market performance is better than either their 
parent’s or son’s, and even exceeds that of the absorbing native population. Toward 
this end, the wages for 1995 were compared in two groups, Asian-African (A) 
immigrants and Israeli-born natives (N), over three generations in Israel. 
  Statistical analysis is carried out in two stages. (1) Wage equations are 
estimated in each immigrant generation and the native population. (2) The wage 
differentials are divided into two components over the three generations in Israel, 
related to gaps in the human capital levels and differences in market evaluation of 
individual characteristics. The first component is then further decomposed into sub-
components, according to observed individual characteristics, namely, education level 
and labor market experience.   10
  The wage decomposition is carried out according to established methods (see, 
for example, Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Cotton, 1988; and Oaxaca et al, 1994). Let 
Wij denotes the wage of individual i in group j. The equation may be expressed in 
logarithmic form as follows: 
(11)     ij
ij
ij j ij e X W + = ∑ β ln , 
where  ij X  is a vector of the independently observed characteristics for individual i in 
group j. The term  j β  denotes the vector of common coefficients for members of 
group j, but may vary across different groups (one of the coefficients is the intercept 
at which Xj = 1), and  ij e  is the error term. 
  The estimated average observed lnWj for group j is given by:   
(12)       ∑ = j j j X W β l n ,         
where  j β  is a vector of the estimated least-squares regression coefficients and  j X is 
a vector for the average observed characteristics of the individuals in group j. Based 
on Equation (12), the wage differential between two groups, a and b, is given by: 
 (13)                     ∑ ∑ − = − b b a a b a X X W W β β ln ln .  
The right hand side of Equation (13) can be decomposed to either:   
(14)                         ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑ − + − = − a b b a b a b a X X X W W β β β ln ln  
or, 
(15)                          ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑ − + − = − a a a b b b a X X X W W β β β ln ln . 
  The terms on the right-hand side of Equations (14) and (15) are the two 
components of the wage differentials between the groups. The first and second terms 
describe the differences between the average characteristics of the groups, and   
market valuations, as manifested in the coefficients in the estimated equations, 
respectively. This probably reflects differences in the quality of the human capital 
between the two groups.   
  In this study, as with wage differentials, the human capital component takes 
into account the last school attended or the highest degree, years of education and   11
experience in the labor market, which is measured as age minus years of schooling 
minus 6 years.  
  Table 3 presents the wage differentials and their decomposition in the three 
generations, based on the wage equations in Table 2. The figures in these tables 
clearly show that for the first and third generations, the wage differentials are higher 
for the Israeli native population whereas, in the second generation the opposite holds. 
According to the decomposition of wage differentials, the human-capital component 
of the wage differentials markedly decreases with the immigrant generations. In the 
first generation, about 70% of the gap in favor of the native population can be 
explained by the differences in the observed characteristics and the other 30% by 
market evaluations. In the second and the third generations, the entire wage 
differential is attributable to market evaluation, and is in favor of the immigrants in 
the second generation but of the native population in the third generation. The results 
of this decomposition is in line with the model, in which disadvantage of the 
immigrant first generation motivates the second generation to increase their labor 
market achievements via higher educational qualifications, as seen in Table 1. 
However, the second generation’s success in labor market leads to reversion to the 
disadvantaged status in the third generation relative to the native population. 
  As with the descriptive data, the wage differential analysis is also consistent 
with the theoretical results. Since descriptive data relating to years of schooling is 
embedded in the wage decomposition, the relationship between immigrant 
generations and their earnings and wages relative to one another and to the native 
population is an inversely U-shaped curve.  
   12
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
Starting with Chiswick (1977, 1978) to Gang and Zimmermann (2000) and 
Gang (1999), more recently, the literature focuses on first- and second- generation 
migrants, in terms of their earnings and economic performance in relation to one 
another and to the native population. However, the migrant third generation has been 
neglected in the literature. Thus, it remained unclear whether: (1) the two-generation 
relationship can be generalized to further generations; and (2) the migrant third 
generation assimilates into the general population.   
In an attempt to address these questions, we developed a three-generation 
migrant model. We proposed a bilateral-altruistic two-generation model of immigrant 
earnings, in which the father’s and son’s utilities are positively linked through their 
earnings. According to the theoretical model, performance of the second generation is 
improved first, while that of third generation falls below the second generation’s but 
is better than that of the first.  
To explore this hypothesis, we analyzed the 1995 Israeli Census of Population, 
covering three generations of migrants to Israel. We showed that the empirical 
analysis coincides with the theoretical findings. An inverse U-shaped relationship of 
the migrant generation data to the migrant education level was found. A similar 
inverse U-shaped curve describes the behavior of the intergenerational earnings 
mobility. The first generation has the lowest relative earnings, the second generation 
the highest relative earnings, and the third generation has earnings that are relatively 
higher than those of the first, but lower than those of the second-generation migrants. 
In conclusion, therefore, generalizations may not be drawn from the two-generation 
migrant model applying to the migrant third generation. These data illustrate a case in 
which the third generation does not assimilate into the local population.   13
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Figure 1:  Relative Earnings (re) by Generation  
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Table 1: Male sample characteristics (%) 1995
* 
 
First generation  Second generation  Third generation   
Variable 
 
N  A Ratio N  A ratio N  A ratio 














































































































































































































* N and A are Israeli and Asian-African origins, respectively. 
   Ratios > 1 are in favor of the natives (N) and ratios < 1 are in favor of the 
   immigrants (A). 
   Figures in parentheses are the standard deviations. 
   Wages are in Israeli shekels at the May 2000 rates. 
 






Figure 2: Ratios of education of natives  immigrants: 
       comparison of three generations 
 
Note: A ratio higher than 1 is in favor of the natives (N) and lower than 1 is in favor 

























Table 2: Wage equations for male employees, 1995
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* The natural logarithm of monthly gross wage is the dependent variable. 
    Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics.   19
 
 
Table 3: Wage differentials their decomposition (standard Oaxaca), 1995
* 
 
Wage differentials  First    
generation 





Total wage (ln) differential 
 
Wage differential components: 
1. Human  capital 
differences: 
              1.1 Schooling 
 
              1.2 Experience 
 




  0.202  (22.5%) 
 
 
  0.148  (73.3%) 
 
  0.178  (93.6%) 
 
 - 0.03  (-20.3%) 
 
 0.054 (26.7%) 
 
-0.180  (-19.5%) 
 
 
-0.018  (-1.8%) 
 
-0.018  (-1.8%) 
 
-          -  
 





-0.002  (-1.2%) 
 
-0.010  (-6.2%) 
 
0.008  (5.0%) 
 
0.163  (101.2%) 
 
* The wage equation of the Israeli native population was used as the basis for the 
decomposition  of wage differentials (the schooling component was calculated from 
the coefficients for five types of school and the experience component from the two 
coefficients relating to years of schooling). Thus, positive values indicate higher wage 
or contribution of the Israeli group, and negative values higher wage in the Asian-
African origin group. The values in brackets (%) are the differences in the average 
estimated wages of the two groups or their relative shares of the decompositions of 
the wage differentials, respectively (thus, the sum of the latter is 100%).  
 
 
    
 